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Respondent BRP, Inc. ("BRP") submits this brief in response to the opening brief of
Appellant Attorney Brian Smith ("Attorney Smith").

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
This appeal questions whether Attorney Smith can assert an attorney's charging lien

under Idaho's attorney's fee lien statute, Idaho Code § 3-205. If so, it also questions the priority
of such a lien when BRP has a right of setoff that is related to the same judgment on which the
attorney's lien purports to attach. Those issues arise from the following circumstances.
Attorney Smith defended his client (Kelly Clay) against an action commenced by Krystal
Kinghorn that sought the return ofa parcel of real property. Clay had obtained the property from
Kinghorn, which he then sold to BRP. BRP was also a defendant to Kinghorn's action and
commenced a cross claim against Clay for breach of a warranty deed. To resolve the actions, the
district court unwound the transfers. The district ordered BRP to reconvey the property to Clay.
The district court also ordered Clay to return the property to Kinghorn, so long as she repaid
Clay $22,235.33 to redeem the property. Kinghorn ultimately tendered the $22,235.33 payment.
Finally, the district court awarded BRP damages on its cross-claim and ordered Clay to
reimburse BRP the price it paid for the property plus its costs, a total of $64,099.96.
Against that backdrop, Attorney Smith seeks to assert and enforce an attorney's lien on
Kinghorn's payment of $22,235.33 to redeem the property from Clay. He does so despite the
fact that Clay commenced no cause of action, filed no counterclaim, recovered no affirmative
relief, and is liable for a judgment that far exceeds the monies repaid by Kinghorn. As explained
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below, Attorney Smith cannot assert an attorney's lien under Idaho Code § 3-205 in such
circumstances and even if he could, the judgment obtained by BRP against Clay is superior to an
attorney's lien. In the proceedings below, the district court agreed and correctly held that
Kinghorn's payment should be directed to BRP. This Court should affirm.

B.

Course Of Proceedings
To secure the judgment on its cross-claim against Clay, not knowing whether Clay would

retain the property or Kinghorn would pay to redeem it, BRP filed a petition for writ of
attachment, seeking to attach either (i) the property (in the event Clay retained it) or (ii) the
$22,235.33 Kinghorn repaid to redeem the property (in the event she chose to do so). R. Vol. II
at 234-36. Attorney Smith filed an opposition to BRP's petition for a writ of attachment and a
motion for an order to perfect an attorney's fees lien. Id. at 245-48,250-51. At the hearing on
BRP's petition and Attorney Smith's motion, Kinghorn's counsel tendered the payment of
$22,235.33 to redeem the property. Id. at 285-86. The district court accepted the tender,
pending a decision on who

either Attorney Smith or BRP - was entitled to those monies. Id.

The district court entered a decision on September 1,2010. Id. at 287. In that order, the
district court found that, based on Kinghorn's tender of the redemption payment, BRP's petition
for a writ of attachment was no longer necessary and that the only remaining issue was whether
Attorney Smith's lien was valid and took priority over BRP's judgment. Id. at 288. Addressing
that issue, the district court found Attorney Smith was not entitled to an attorney's lien and
ordered Kinghorn's payment "be delivered directly to BRP to cover, in part, its judgment against
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Clay." ld. at 291. On Attorney Smith's motion, the district court entered a Rule 54(b)
Certificate deeming its order a final judgment. ld. at 298-99. This appeal followed. ld. at 300.

C.

Statement Of Facts
The facts material to this appeal arise from the proceedings below and the many decisions

entered by the district court to unwind the transfers of the property. The facts, as found by the
district court, are undisputed and unchallenged. They begin with Kinghorn filing a complaint
against Clay, BRP, and The Bank of Commerce on May 29,2007, seeking the return of real
property Clay sold to BRP a month earlier. R. Vol. I at 13-22. Years before, Kinghorn applied
for a $20,000 loan from The Bank of Commerce and pledged the property, which she owned at
the time, as collateral. R. Vol. II at 206. Kinghorn asked Clay to co-sign the loan, and Clay
agreed but required Kinghorn to sign a quitclaim deed, to be recorded in the event she failed to
make timely payments on the loan. ld.; R. Vol. I at 138. Kinghorn granted Clay a quitclaim
deed and also signed a loan guarantee agreement. R. Vol. I at 27-29.
In March 2007, Kinghorn defaulted on the loan. R. Vol. II at 207. Clay paid The Bank
of Commerce $19,820.75 - the balance of the loan - and recorded the quitelaim deed. ld.; R.
Vol. I at 175. A month later, Clay sold the property to BRP for $30,000, delivered title and a
warranty deed to BRP, and pursuant to the warranty deed, pledged to warrant and defend "the
quiet and peaceable possession of said premises ... against the claims of all persons." R. Vol. I
at 139, 184-86. Kinghorn's complaint followed, seeking the return of the property. Clay served
his answer to the complaint on June 22, 2007 and asserted no counterclaim against Kinghorn or
cross-claim against BRP or The Bank of Commerce. ld. at 99. BRP also answered. ld. at 109.
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In a series of orders that followed, the district court dismissed The Bank of Commerce,

id. at 127-31, and found that (i) the quitclaim deed Kinghorn granted Clay was a mortgage, id. at
141-43; (ii) Kinghorn had a right to redeem the property, id. at 143; (iii) Kinghorn had a right of
redemption that was denied to her, id. at 143, R. Vol. II at 215; (iv) BRP was not a bona fide
purchaser, R. Vol. I at 167; (v) Clay must hold a foreclosure sale of the property, id. at 170; and
(vi) BRP must convey the property to Clay, id. at 180-81.
Following the latter order - that BRP must return the property - BRP filed a cross-claim
against Clay on September 22, 2009 for breach of the warranty deed, seeking reimbursement of
the $30,000 BRP paid for the property, plus interest and $1,408.96 in property taxes and
insurance expenses. See id. at 187-89. Clay answered the cross-claim but did not contest it. See

id. at 191-93. In the meantime, rather than hold a foreclosure sale, Kinghorn and Clay entered
into a stipulation to perform an accounting and allow the district court to determine the items
charged to each. Id. at 173-78. The stipulation also provided that Clay would convey title to the
property to Kinghorn, but Clay would have no obligation to do so if Kinghorn failed to pay Clay
with six months of a determination of the amounts owed. Id. at 174.
To fully unwind the transactions, the district court entered another series of orders. In
one, the district court entered summary judgment in favor ofBRP on its cross-claim against
Clay, finding Clay breached the warranty deed. R. Vol. II at 215. Another order addressed
BRP's attorney fees for Clay's failure to defend BRP under the warranty deed and as the
prevailing party on the cross-claim. Id. at 219-26. The district court awarded BRP $32,691 in
attorney fees. Id. The district court later entered a "final jUdgment" on BRP's cross-claim
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against Clay, awarding BRP $31,408.96 in damages (plus statutory interest) and the attorney fee
award - for a total award of $64,099.96. Id. at 231-32.
The district court also addressed the accounting between Kinghorn and Clay and found
Clay was entitled to $19,820.75 (the amount he paid The Bank of Commerce) plus $2,414.58
(his expenses to maintain the property) - for a total of$22,235.33. Id. at 206-15. In that same
order, the district court found Clay was not entitled to his attorney fees incurred in defending
Kinghorn's claims under their loan guarantee agreement because "Defendant Clay's attorney's
fees were not incurred 'to enforce (the) Agreement' but, rather, were incurred to defend against
Plaintiffs action to enforce her right of redemption." !d. at 212.
Once the accounting was complete, the district court entered an order on Kinghorn and
Clay's stipulation and ordered Kinghorn to pay Clay $22,235.33 on or before July 26,2010 or
Clay would have no obligation to return the property to Kinghorn. !d. at 242-43. As noted
above, what followed were the proceedings leading to this appeal: BRP's petition for a writ of
attachment, Attorney Smith's motion for an order to perfect an attorney's fees lien, Kinghorn's
payment of$22,235.33 to redeem the property, and the district court's order denying Attorney
Smith an attorney's lien and directing Kinghorn's payment to BRP.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The only issues presented on appeal stem from the district court's order denying Attorney
Smith an attorney's lien and distributing Kinghorn's payment to BRP. Neither Attorney Smith
nor Clay has appealed any of the district court's other orders or findings. BRP restates the issues
presented on appeal, as follows:
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1.

Whether the district court correctly denied Attorney Smith's attempt to assert an

attorney's lien under Idaho Code § 3-205 on the basis that Clay had not commenced a cause of
action or filed a counterclaim.
2.

If the district court erred in that ruling, whether Attorney Smith can assert an

attorney's lien under Idaho Code § 3-205 when Clay recovered no affirmative relief from a
judgment in his favor and no proceeds on which a lien could attach.
3.

If Attorney Smith can assert a valid attorney's lien, whether BRP's right to a

setoff of the damages it was awarded on its cross-claim against Clay is superior to Attorney
Smith's attorney's lien.
4.

Whether BRP is entitled to its costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LA.R.

40 and Idaho Code § 12-121.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
BRP seeks costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 40 and Idaho Code § 12121, respectively, for the reasons stated below in Section v.n of this brief.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
The interpretation and application of a statute are questions of law that are subject to free
review by the Court. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 2?9, 292
(2009). The standards governing statutory interpretation are well-founded. In Farber, the Court
explained that the objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislature. Id.
To determine legislative intent,
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[s]tatutory interpretation begins with the literal language ofthe statute. Provisions
should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be
void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous,
the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and the
Court need not consider rules of statutory construction. Therefore, the plain
meaning of a statute will prevail unless it leads to absurd results.

Id. at 310-11, 208 P .3d at 292-93 (citations omitted). Thus, only where a statute is ambiguous
must the Court engage in statutory construction. Id. at 310,208 P .3d at 292. A statute is
ambiguous if its language is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, but ambiguity
does not occur "merely because parties present differing interpretations to the court." Id. at 311,
208 P.2d at 293.

V. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Correctly Denied Attorney Smith's Attempt To
Assert And Enforce An Attorney's Lien Under Idaho Code § 3-205.
The principal flaw in Attorney Smith's brief is that he ignores the plain and unambiguous

language of Idaho Code § 3-205. That statute provides:
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left
to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by
law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer
containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon
his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report,
decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever
hands they may come; and cannot be affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment.
Idaho Code § 3-205. The critical language is the statute's second sentence, which makes clear
that an attorney possesses a charging lien when (I) the attorney's client commences a cause of
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BRP INCORPORATED - 7
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action or files a counterclaim and (2) there is a judgment in the client's favor and proceeds
thereof. Id. As explained below, neither of those requirements is satisfied here.

1.

Attorney Smith Cannot Assert An Attorney's Lien Under
Idaho Code § 3-205 Because Clay Did Not Commence A Cause
of Action Or Serve An Answer Containing A Counterclaim.

The district court denied Attorney Smith's motion for an order to perfect an attorney's
lien on the basis that
Smith never commenced an action or filed a counterclaim on behalf of Clay
against Kinghorn. Under White [v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 136
Idaho 238, 31 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2001),] and the plain language ofLC. § 3-205,
Smith does not have an attorney's lien on Clay'S proceeds from Kinghorn's
redemption check.

R. Vol. II at 291. The district court was correct in its ruling. Indeed, it is undisputed that Clay
never commenced an action or filed a counterclaim and that Attorney Smith merely defended
Clay against the action commenced by Kinghorn. That Attorney Smith does not have a charging
lien in such circumstances is clear from both the statute and Idaho jurisprudence.
Beginning with Idaho Code § 3-205, it very clearly reads that "[f]rom the commencement
of an action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for
a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim." (Emphases added.) Under
the plain meaning of that language, an attorney's lien attaches to "his client's cause of action or
counterclaim" and it does so from the commencement of the action or the filing of the
counterclaim. Thus, an attorney's lien does not attach to another party's cause of action or
counterclaim. Nor does an attorney's lien attach to a claim or action his client may have had but
does not affirmatively pursue; the client must commence or file an action. Contrary to the
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arguments made by Attorney Smith, he cannot assert a charging lien on Kinghorn's action
against Clay or on a claim Clay may have had against Kinghorn. See Appellant's Brief at 13-18.
The Idaho Court of Appeals endorsed that reading of Idaho Code § 3-205 in White when
it observed the commencement of an action or filing of a counterclaim is "a prerequisite for the
creation of an attorney's charging lien."] 136 Idaho at 241, 31 P.2d at 929. In White, an attorney
(White) represented a client (Krivanec) injured in a car accident and negotiated a settlement with
the other driver's insurer. !d. at 239, 31 P.2d at 927. The settlement was reached before
Krivanec commenced a cause of action against the other driver. !d. A hospital, which provided
medical services to Krivanec after the accident, asserted a hospital lien on the settlement
proceeds. Id. White contested the hospital's lien contending his attorney's lien was superior. Id.
The Court of Appeals disagreed: "In the present case, because no action was filed on behalf of
Ms. Krivanec before payment of the settlement, White did not acquire a lien under I.e. § 3-205."

Id. at 241-42, 31 P.3d at 929-30 (emphasis added).
Attorney Smith seeks to distinguish White on the basis that "[t]here was no action
commenced in which attorney White appeared at the time he recovered the proceeds for his
client," while in the proceedings underlying this appeal a cause of action was commenced, albeit
by Kinghorn. Appellant's Brief at 15. Attorney Smith misreads White. The question there was
whether an attorney's lien can arise when no "lawsuit has been initiated by the attorney against
] That statement in White actually begins by referring to the "plain language ofLC. § 45701." As the district court recognized, the citation to Idaho Code § 45-701 is most certainly a
clerical error given the context of the passage. R. Vol. II at 290 n.l.
BRIEF O:F RESPONDENT BRP INCORPORATED - 9
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the wrongdoer on behalf of the injured person." 136 Idaho at 241,31 P.2d at 929 (emphasis
added). White did not acquire an attorney's lien because his client did not commence an action,
not because there was no action commenced at all. Id. at 241-42,31 P.2d at 929-30. Further, the
fact that White's client could have filed an action was not enough to create an attorney's lien.
Thus White confirms what Attorney Smith ignores: under the clear language of Idaho Code

§ 3-205 he can only assert an attorney's lien on an action commenced or filed by Clay.
In an attempt to side-step the statute and White, Attorney Smith relies nearly exclusively
on Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 625 P.2d 1072, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). See
Appellant's Brief at 15-17. According to Attorney Smith, the statute can be read "broadly"
because, under Skelton, "[a]ttorney's liens exist for 'services rendered in matters growing out of
or in connection with the case in which judgment is rendered. '" Id. at 16, 17 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Skelton, 102 Idaho at 74,625 P.2d at 1077). In truth, Skelton announces no such

rule. 2 Moreover, the facts and holding of the decision set it apart from the instant circumstances.
While Skelton has relevance here (as explained below), it does not stand for the proposition that

Attorney Smith quotes directly from Skelton for the proposition that "[a]ttorney's liens
exist for 'services rendered in matters growing out of or in connection with the case in which
judgment is rendered. '" Appellant's Brief at 16, 17 (quoting Skelton, 102 Idaho at 74, 625 P.2d
at 1077). That quotation is not a holding of Skelton but describes the subject matter of a legal
annotation. See Skelton, 102 Idaho at 74,625 P.2d at 1077. The passage in question reads:
2

Case law supports the recognition of the nature of such
interdependent actions and the single assertion of a lien to secure
compensation for the services provided therein. A number of older
cases directly addressing this point are annotated at 97 A.L.R.
1133, "Attorney's charging lien as including services rendered or
(continued ...)
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an attorney's lien can be enforced when the attorney's client fails to commence or file an action
and the attorney merely defends his client against an action.
In Skelton, a law firm (Rigby & Thatcher) represented a client (Spencer) in two causes of
action commenced by Spencer and eventually settled both actions in Spencer's favor. 102 Idaho
at 70-72,625 P.2d at 1073-75. When Spencer later fired Rigby & Thatcher and refused to
perform the settlement agreements, the other parties commenced a third action to enforce those
agreements. Id. at 71,625 P.2d at 1074. Rigby & Thatcher filed a petition in that action to
enforce an attorney's lien against the settlement proceeds. Id. at 72,625 P.2d at 1075. The
question raised in Skelton was not whether an attorney's lien could attach to the settlement
proceeds - clearly it could under those facts - but for which actions and in which actions the
enforcement of the lien was proper. See id. at 74,625 P.2d at 1077. The Court held that Rigby
& Thatcher could enforce its lien in any of the three causes of action - either the two actions

commenced by Spencer or the action commenced to enforce the settlement agreements - but that
the latter action was the most reasonable. !d. at 75,625 P.2d at 1078.
\

( ... continued)
disbursements made in other than the instant action or proceeding."
(Subsection "b" of that annotation concerns liens for services
rendered in matters growing out of or in connection with the case
in which judgment is rendered.) The lapse of time has not
impaired the logic of these cases.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus Attorney Smith's reliance on Skelton for his argument that he is
entitled to an attorney's lien under Idaho Code § 3-205 simply because his services grew out of
or were in connection with Kinghorn's action is unsupported and entirely misplaced.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BRP INCORPORATED - 11
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Thus, the issue addressed in Skelton is not an issue raised in this appeal. BRP does not
challenge the proceeding in which Attorney Smith seeks to assert an attorney's lien but his right
to such a lien. More importantly, unlike here, the attorneys in Skelton enforced an attorney's lien
attached to settlement proceeds recovered in actions commenced by their client. For that very
reason, the proposition that Skelton supports a charging lien asserted by Attorney Smith because
it "arises out of 'services rendered in matters growing out of or in connection with the case in
which judgment is rendered,''' Appellant's Brief at 16, 17, cannot be sustained. But even if that
proposition were true/ Skelton cannot be extended to the instant circumstances where no action
was commenced or filed by Clay and Attorney Smith simply defended Clay's interests.
Attorney Smith also ignores that Skelton is representative of how Idaho courts have
consistently applied Idaho Code § 3-205: finding attorney's liens attach to the "client's cause of
action or counterclaim." See, e.g., Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1986)
(finding attorney who represented client in successful 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action had valid claim of
lien); Hansbrough v. D. W. Standrod & Co., 43 Idaho 119,249 P. 897 (1926) (finding attorney's
lien attached to client's proceeds from foreclosure actions commenced by client). Attorney
Smith has pointed to no Idaho jurisprudence - and indeed BRP has found none - that dispenses
with that requirement and holds an attorney's lien exists in the absence ofa client's action and
solely for services rendered in defending the client.

3

See supra n. 2.
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Idaho is not alone in that application ofIdaho Code § 3-205. States such as Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma share an attorney's lien statute virtually
identical to Idaho's. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.130; Mont. Code Anno. § 37-61-420; N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:13-5; N.Y. Jud. Law § 475; Okla. Stat. tit. 5, § 6. Interpreting the same statutory
language at issue here, courts in those states hold that a client asserts no cause of action, and thus
no attorney's lien attaches, when the client retains an attorney solely to defend him. See, e.g.,

Reidv. Reid, 906 S.W.2d 740, 742-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (finding attorneys do not have
statutory attorney's lien under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.130 when solely defending client because
client had no cause of action upon which lien could attach); United States v JH W & Gitlitz Deli
& Bar, inc., 499 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (SD.N.Y. 1980) (finding attorney's representation of

defendant in resisting claim against him does not invoke protection of attorney's lien under N.Y.
Jud. Law § 475 unless counterclaim is asserted).4

There are many other examples of such decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Clinton,
260 F. Supp. 84, 90 (S.D.N. Y. 1966) (finding attorney who represents defendant cannot have
charging lien in absence ofa counterclaim); Wilde v. Wilde, 184 A.2d 758, 759 (N.J. Ch. 1962)
(finding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 13-5 provides lien for attorney who has filed complaint, a
counterclaim or a cross-claim and successful defense of client's title to realty or personalty will
not, apart from statute or agreement, give attorney basis for claiming lien); In re Lambert, 109
A.2d 423,424 (N.J. Ch. 1954) (finding lien for attorney's services in action in which client was
adjudicated mentally competent to manage her own affairs did not apply because representation
of client was purely defensive in nature); Holloway v. Wright, 215 P. 937, 938 (Okl. 1923)
(finding attorney has statutory lien upon his client's affirmative cause of action only, and thus
"lien cannot be extended to services which merely protect an existing right or title of his client's
property.").
4
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In Reid, for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals found a law firm did not have a valid
attorney's lien because the law firm's client did not file an action or counterclaim and thus a lien
had nothing to which to attach. 906 S.W.2d at 742-43. The court explained that:
When a client is sued, and retains counsel solely to defend, the client is asserting
no cause of action. It is only if a counterclaim is filed on behalf of the client that
he is claiming to have a cause of action against the plaintiff. Thus, if there is no
counterclaim, and the lawyer merely defends against the plaintiffs claim, the
client has no cause of action upon which an attorneys' lien can attach.

Id. at 742-43 (citing Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. 4550 Main Assocs., 893 S.W.2d 861, 869
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995). The same reasoning applies here. Attorney Smith merely defended Clay
against Kinghorn's suit and thus there is no cause of action to which his lien can attach.
As the above discussion shows, Attorney Smith cannot assert an attorney's lien on
another party's cause of action or on a claim his client may have had but did not affirmatively
pursue by filing an action. To the contrary, courts considering the language used in Idaho Code
§ 3-205- whether in Idaho or elsewhere - apply its plain meaning to hold that an attorney's lien
attaches to "his client's cause of action or counterclaim." When the client does not commence
an action or file a counterclaim, as in White, or merely defends against an action, as in Reid, the
attorney's lien has nothing to which to attach. Here the district court correctly concluded that
Attorney Smith cannot assert an attorney's lien because Clay never filed a cause of action or
counterclaim. See R. Vol. II at 291. This Court should affirm on that basis alone.
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2.

Attorney Smith Cannot Assert An Attorney's Lien Under
Idaho Code § 3-205 Because Clay Recovered No Affirmative
Relief From A Judgment In His Favor And No Proceeds On
Which A Lien Could Attach.

But even if the Court finds that Attorney Smith's charging lien can attach to Kinghorn's
cause of action or a claim Clay might have had, Attorney Smith still cannot satisfy the
requirements ofIdaho Code § 3-205. As noted, the statute clearly states that an attorney's lien
"attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof."
Idaho Code § 3-205. In other words, the statute limits an attorney's lien to outcomes where
"proceeds" or a "fund" from a decision or judgment have been obtained "in his client's favor."

See Skelton, 102 Idaho at 75,625 P.2d at 1078. In Skelton, the Court explained that:
the intent of the law on this point is to allow the attorney an interest in the fruits of
his skill and labors. The lien secures his right to compensation for obtaining the
recovery of "fund" for his client. Of course, where the attorney's efforts are
sterile, there would be nothing against which the lien right could be asserted, but
where he has produced a fund, he has an equitable interest therein recognized by
the lien statute and relevant case law.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Banque Indosuez v. Sopwith Holdings Corp., 772 N.E.2d 1112,
1117 (N. Y. 2002) ("the litigation or settlement must result in more than the mere entry of a
judgment on behalf of a client: there must be proceeds from the litigation upon which the lien
can affix.") Here Attorney Smith cannot take advantage of the statute because Clay obtained no
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affirmative recovery from a judgment in his favor and no proceeds thereof. s That is true for two
reasons.
First, Attorney Smith did not recover a fund on behalf of Clay because he merely
defended and protected Clay's interest in the property. As noted by the district court,
"Defendant Clay's attorney's fees were not incurred 'to enforce (the) Agreement' but, rather,
were incurred to defend against Plaintiffs action to enforce her right of redemption." See R.
Vol. II at 212 (quoting Clay's argument). "An attorney who merely defends or protects his
client's interests in property without obtaining an affirmative recovery is not entitled to a lien on
the property that his client retains." See Rosenman & Colin v. Richard, 850 F.2d 57, 61 (2nd Cir.
1988) (applyingN.Y. Jud. Law § 475).
That Attorney Smith merely defended Clay and recovered no fund on his behalf is also
evident by the district court's orders to unwind the transfers of the property and restore the
parties to their original positions before the transactions occurred. The district court explained
its resolution as follows:
The end result of Kinghorn's suit was for this court to unwind the transaction.
Kinghorn and Clay stipulated to Kinghorn repaying Clay the balance on the loan
in return for Clay delivering title on the property. As a result ofBRP's claims
against Clay, this court has ordered Clay to pay BRP $31,408.96 for the unwound
transaction and $32,691.00 in fees and costs related to defending the lawsuit.

5 Even though the district court did not directly address this issue, the Court can affirm
the district court on alternative grounds. See Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 455, 65 P .3d 192,
196 (2003) (finding that where relevant facts are undisputed, reviewing court may apply law to
undisputed facts de novo).
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R. Vol. II at 288. Ultimately, Kinghorn redeemed the property for $22,235.33, the amounts Clay
expended to pay off Kinghorn's loan and to maintain the property for a brief time. Id. In effect,
the district court simply preserved Clay's interest in the property - whether that be the property
itself or the repayment of monies to redeem the property.
Having obtained no affirmative relief through Attorney Smith's efforts, Clay recovered
no fund for Attorney Smith's lien to attach to. In the words of Skelton, Attorney Smith's "efforts
were sterile." 102 Idaho at 75,625 P.2d at 1078; see also Rosenman & Colin, 850 F.2d at 62-63
(finding attorneys did not create proceeds to which charging lien could attach when client merely
retained two sculptures and was repaid on loan for another sculpture); Hill v. Turney, 710 P.2d
50,57-58 (Mont. 1985) (finding attorney had no ,basis for charging lien on cattle when jury
found against client's claim for conversion of cattle and awarded damages to defendant on
counterclaim but directed defendant to return cattle as condition of damages).
Second, the monies Kinghorn repaid to Clay do not create proceeds or a fund in favor of
Clay because BRP is entitled to a setoff of the damages it was awarded on its cross-claim against
Clay. "[T]he right of setoff exists in Idaho, except where denied or limited." Brown v. Porter,
42 Idaho 295, 298, 245 P. 398 (1926); see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(b) (allowing for offset and "a
single judgment for the difference between the entitlements" when "any parties to an action are
entitled to judgments against each other such as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon crossclaims"). There is no such limitation in Idaho Code § 3-205. Clay won no recovery because
BRP's judgment of $64,099.96 exceeded the $22,235.33 Kinghorn tendered to repay Clay.
There are no funds left for Attorney Smith to attach a charging lien to under the statute. See
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Banque Jndosuez, 772 N.E.2d at 1117-18 ("[W]here competing claims arise out of the same

transaction or instrument, an attorney's charging lien under section 475 will be recoverable
against the client's net recovery .... ")

***
In sum, under the facts presented here, Idaho Code § 3-205 imposes two fundamental
requirements that must be met before an attorney's lien can be asserted. First, a charging lien is
only available to an attorney whose client commenced a cause of action or filed a counterclaim.
Second, the attorney may only place a lien on funds that are a result of the successful prosecution
of such actions. Attorney Smith can satisfy neither of those requirements. As such, the
underlying basis for Attorney Smith's appeal fails, and the Court's review can end here.
B.

Even If Attorney Smith Has A Valid Attorney's Lien Under Idaho
Code § 3-205, BRP's Right To A Setoff Is Superior To His Lien.
Attorney Smith also argues that a "charging lien attached to the district court's decision

awarding Clay $22,235.33" is superior to any interest BRP may have in those monies.
Appellant's Brief at 18. But even if Attorney Smith can meet the requirements for an attorney's
lien under Idaho Code § 3-205, BRP's right to a setoff is superior to his lien. See Dawson v.
Eldredge, 89 Idaho 402, 408-09, 405 P.2d 754, 758 (1965). In Dawson, the Court denied a lien

right when the debt owed was subject to a complete adjudicated offset. Jd. at 409,405 P.2d at
758 ("Because the counterclaim is a complete setoff, the lien is not applicable.").
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A similar rule has also been expressed in other states with statutes using language
identical to Idaho Code § 3-205. In Banque Indosuez, 772 N.E.2d at 1117, for instance, the New
York Court of Appeals recognized that:
[0 Jur decisions ... indicate that an attorney's charging lien maintains superiority
over a right of setoff where the setoff is unrelated to the judgment or settlement to
which the attorney's lien attached. However, we conclude that a different rule
should apply here, where the setoff is the result of judgments emanating from the
same transaction or instrument.
772 N.E.2d at 1117 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added). Others states hold the same.

See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 10 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("The general rule in Missouri
is that, if 'the cause and the setoff are related to the same matter, the lien attached only to the
surplus that may be adjudged the plaintiff after a balance is struck. ,,, (quotation omitted»);

Hobson Construction Co. v. Max Drill, Inc., 385 A.2d 1256, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) ("equitable principles require that the party holding the excess judgment should not be
burdened by the fee of the attorney representing the losing litigant."); Galbreath v. Armstrong,
193 P.2d 630, 634 (Mont. 1948) ("The general rule is that while an attorney's lien is subordinate
to the rights of the adverse party to offset judgments in the same actions or in actions based on
the same actions or in actions based on the same transaction, it is nevertheless superior to any
right to offset judgments obtained in wholly independent actions.")
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Reed explained the policy behind this rule: "Where
different claims arise in the course of the same suit, or in relation to the same matter, it is
undoubtedly equitable and just that these equities should be arranged between the parties without
reference to the solicitor or attorney's lien." Reed, 10 S.W.3d at 179 (quotation omitted). Thus
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"[h]is lien is only on the clear balance due to his client after all the equities are settled." Id.
(quotation omitted). The same reasoning should apply here. Like Missouri and other states
recognizing that rule, Idaho law also finds attorney's liens are equitable in nature. See Frazee v.
Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983). Further, there is no question that BRP's

cross-claim against Clay arose in the course of Kinghorn's action against Clay. See Idaho R.
Civ. P. 13(g) (allowing cross-claim arising out of transaction or occurrence that is subject matter
of original action).
Nor is there any question that BRP's judgment against Clay exceeded the payment by
Kinghorn to redeem the property. As in Reed (and the other cases cited above), it would be
unjust and unfair to allow Attorney Smith to obtain the benefit of the $22,235.33 repaid by
Kinghorn when BRP is entitled to reimbursement from Clay on a judgment that arises from the
same transaction and dispute. In short, BRP should not be burdened by the fees of Attorney
Smith in representing Clay, the losing litigant, and Clay should be allowed to avoid a portion of
the judgment owed to BRP. For this reason too, BRP is entitled to the $22,235.33 payment.

C.

The District Court Correctly Found That BRP's Petition For A Writ
Of Attachment Was Unnecessary Once Kinghorn Tendered Payment
To Redeem The Property.
Attorney Smith also argues the district court erred when it failed to consider BRP's

Petition for a Writ of Attachment under Idaho Code § 8-501. Appellant's Brief at 21. At the
hearing, the district court recognized that once Kinghorn tendered her payment to redeem the
property, "the only remaining issue to consider was whether Smith's lien took priority over
BRP's judgment." R. Vol. II. at 288. The district court did not err. The district court had no
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reason to address BRP's petition because Kinghorn's payment effectively mooted the issue: the
payment was tendered to the district court and the district court had the authority to decide
priority to those monies given BRP's judgment against Clay. Moreover, there can be no error
because Attorney Smith did not have a valid attorney's lien and even if he did, BRP was still
entitled to a setoff of its judgment against Clay. Attorney Smith's claim of error in this regard
should also be denied. 6

D.

BRP Is Entitled To Costs And Attorney Fees On Appeal.
BRP seeks costs on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 40. BRP also seeks its attorney fees on

appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, which permits the award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party if the Court determines the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. See Troche v. Gier, 118 Idaho 740, 742, 800 P.2d 136, 138
(1990) (holding that attorney fees should be awarded when court believes that appeal has been
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation). As explained above,
Attorney Smith failed to assert legitimate issues regarding the proper interpretation of Idaho
6 Even though the district court did not reach the merits ofBRP's petition for a writ of
attachment, Attorney Smith contends BRP was not entitled to a writ. Appellant's Brief at 18-21.
Although such an argument has no relevance to or bearing on the outcome of this appeal, taking
each of the arguments in order, Attorney Smith is mistaken. First, by the plain language of Idaho
Code § 8-501, BRP is entitled to seek a writ "at the time of issuing of summons, or at any time
afterwards." There is no requirement that a writ be obtained before a judgment is issued.
Second, BRP recovered a judgment on its cross claim against Clay based on a warranty deed.
Thus BRP sued on a contract for the direct payment of money and received that relief through a
judgment. See Wallace v. Perry, 74 Idaho 86, 91, 257 P.2d 231,234 (1953). Third, the affidavit
supporting BRP's petition attests that the indebtedness is upon the judgment BRP obtained
against Clay in successfully prosecuting its cross-claim. R. Vol. II at 239-40. The affidavit
therefore met the requirements ofIdaho Code § 8-502(a) in that respect and in all others.
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Code § 3-205, and therefore, pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.

VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, BRP respectfully requests the Court affirm the district
court's order denying Attorney Smith's motion to perfect an attorney's fees lien on Kinghorn's
redemption payment and instead, distributing the funds to BRP. BRP also requests that the
Court find it the prevailing party on appeal and award it costs and attorney fees.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 26th day of August, 2011.
STOEL RIVES LLP

w~
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